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In this paper I examine the rates at which adults in households recently receiving Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) become jobless, apply for and receive unemployment insurance 
(UI) benefits, and participate in publicly funded employment services. I also investigate the correlation of 
UI and employment services receipt with maintenance of self-sufficiency through return to work and 
independence from TANF. The analysis is based on person-level administrative program records from 
four of the nine largest states between 1997 and 2003. Evidence suggests that three-quarters of new 
TANF leavers experience joblessness within three years, and one-quarter of the newly jobless apply for 
UI benefits. About 87 percent of UI applicants have sufficient prior earnings to qualify for UI benefits; 
however, only about 44 percent qualify based on their job separation reasons. Among all UI applicants, 
TANF leavers were found to have much higher rates of voluntary quits and employer dismissals than non-
TANF leavers. Nonetheless, 50 percent of TANF leavers who apply for UI ultimately receive benefits. 
Public employment services are used by one-quarter of newly jobless TANF leavers. Among UI 
applicants, more than 75 percent use public employment services whether they receive UI benefits or not, 
while only 14 percent of newly jobless TANF leavers who do not apply for UI choose to use public 
employment services. Among TANF leavers who become jobless and apply for UI, the rate of return to 
TANF is lower for those who receive UI benefits. Rates of return to TANF are highest among 
nonbeneficiary UI applicants and non-UI applicants with low recent earnings.  
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 changed 
welfare in the United States by establishing Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). 
This law introduced lifetime limits on cash assistance and established work requirements for 
TANF cash benefits eligibility. These changes increased the importance of public employment 
and training programs for maintaining self-sufficiency after TANF exit. Key among these 
programs are unemployment insurance (UI), which provides temporary partial wage replacement 
to the involuntarily jobless, and the U.S. Employment Service (ES), which provides job 
matching and other reemployment services.1 The ES also administers the work test to ensure that 
UI beneficiaries are able, available, and actively seeking work. 
Using state administrative data from four of the nine most populous U.S. states, this study 
expands on prior knowledge about the receipt of UI benefits and ES services by recent TANF 
leavers. I examine the incidence of joblessness after TANF exit and the rates of UI application, 
eligibility, and receipt of cash UI benefits. I also report on the correlation between UI receipt and 
patterns of self-sufficiency. Using data from Georgia and Ohio I then examine participation in 
Wagner-Peyser–funded ES services and the importance of these services to newly jobless TANF 
leavers. In addition to studying outcomes for UI applicants, I also look at the self-sufficiency and 
use of ES services by non-UI applicants.  
1 The ES delivers reemployment services as a partner in state one-stop service centers. The ES services 
examined in this paper were delivered by one-stop centers in Ohio (Ohio Means Jobs Centers) and Georgia (Georgia 
Career Centers). The services were paid for with Wagner-Peyser funding, which is a stream generated by the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) levy paid by employers on taxable wages.  
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE USE OF UI BY WELFARE LEAVERS  
 Among women who received Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and then 
left the program for employment, Kaye (1997) estimates that about 13 percent of those leaving 
AFDC would draw a UI benefit, while about 35 percent would accumulate sufficient earnings 
and work experience to qualify for UI. Gustafson and Levine (1997) examine leavers from 
AFDC using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and estimate the proportion 
satisfying simulated UI monetary eligibility in data spanning 1979 to 1994 (Table 1). Among 
those leaving welfare, Gustafson and Levine estimate that 70–85 percent would meet or exceed 
the monetary eligibility requirements for UI and about 25 percent of women with job separations 
would satisfy nonmonetary eligibility requirements for UI. Since only a small proportion of UI 
eligible jobless actually draw UI compensation, Gustafson and Levine estimate that about 10 
percent of AFDC leavers would get UI benefits. They assert that the provision mandating that 
separations be “involuntary” would prevent most workers from gaining UI eligibility and 
conjectured that the UI system will provide little additional support to the safety net following 
welfare reform.  
 Vroman (1998) examines average earnings rates and UI eligibility requirements across 
states at the time TANF was implemented. He reports that about 35 percent of all jobless persons 
receive UI benefits with that rate higher at the beginning of recessions and in states with weaker 
eligibility criteria. He speculates that compared to others in the workforce, TANF leavers are 
likely to have higher jobless rates, lower wage rates, higher rates of voluntary quits and 
discharges, and lower availability for full-time work. Vroman infers that among jobless TANF 
leavers, only about 20 percent will qualify for UI benefits. He warned that UI is not likely to 
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evolve in ways that broaden eligibility for TANF leavers and that UI is “likely to play a very 
limited support role for TANF leavers” (Vroman, p. 5). 
 
Table 1  Previous Estimates for Welfare Leavers of Percentage Rates for UI Monetary and Nonmonetary 








of UI (%) 
Gustafson and 
Levine (1997) 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
aged 14–22 in 1979. Data from 1979 to 
1994 on 43,913 job separations 
including 4,213 by AFDC leavers.  
Up to 85 About 25 About 10 
Vroman (1998) Estimates based on 1996 UI state wage 
and earnings, state UI recipiency, and 
eligibility rates, assuming part-time 
minimum wage employment.  
— — Up to 20 
Holzer (2000) Estimates based on 1997–1999 
employment and earnings of hired 
welfare recipients in a survey of 3,000 
employers in four large American cities. 
— — Under 30 
Kaye (2001) Survey of Program Dynamics data for 
the year 2000 on 56,0000 persons. 
Simulated UI eligibility for those at risk 
of welfare receipt. 
81 36 25 
Rangarajan, 
Razafindrakoto, 
and Corson (2002)  
New Jersey data from the Work First NJ 
evaluation tracking 2,000 TANF 
beneficiaries in the 18 months starting 
July 1997. 




National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work 
grants in metropolitan counties in five 
states. TANF leavers September 1999 to 
August 2000. Each state sample ranged 
in size from 1,000 to 15,000. 
90 — — 
O’Leary and Kline 
(2008) 
Administrative data from Florida, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Texas. Differing 
ranges between 1996 and 2006. TANF 
leaver for yearly employment state 
samples ranged from 23,706 to 94,662.  
91 36 55 
 
 Holzer (2000) examines earnings and employment of TANF leavers in the years 
immediately following implementation of TANF. Based on his survey of 3,000 employers in 
four large American cities between 1997 and 1999, he asserts that more claimants would qualify 
monetarily for UI than in earlier years. Nonetheless, Holzer warns that several remaining barriers 
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to UI eligibility could be significant. These include job separations due to voluntary quits and 
dismissals for cause, lack of availability for full-time work, and employment in informal jobs or 
others not covered by UI. 
 Kaye (2001) estimates the likelihood that workers at risk of public assistance receipt 
would meet UI monetary and nonmonetary eligibility requirements in 2000. Her analysis uses 
the nationally representative Survey of Program Dynamics. Annual waves of the survey include 
responses from about 16,000 households and 56,000 persons. She is able to simulate UI 
eligibility for all but the nine least populated states. She does not analyze welfare leavers, but 
rather those at risk of welfare receipt. She estimates that 81 percent of at-risk workers would 
meet the UI monetary eligibility requirements in 1998. Among these, Kaye estimates that less 
than three-quarters had a qualifying job separation, 40 percent were not available for full-time 
work, and 64 percent were unlikely to be both available and actively seeking work. The net result 
is a beneficiary rate of about 25 percent among likely UI applicants.  
 Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson (2002) study the extent to which former welfare 
recipients are likely to be eligible for UI and the rate at which those who leave TANF for work 
file UI claims. Their analysis is based on data from the Work First New Jersey evaluation, which 
tracks a representative statewide sample of 2,000 TANF recipients who were paid benefits 
during the first 18 months after TANF started in July 1997. They find that nearly 75 percent of 
those who left TANF for employment would be monetarily eligible for UI at some point during 
the first two years after TANF exit. Among these, about 40 percent would satisfy nonmonetary 
eligibility requirements. UI ineligibility for nonmonetary reasons would be twice as high among 
TANF leavers as for all other UI claimants in New Jersey. This could be driven in part by the 
TANF requirement to claim UI before returning to TANF. Overall, about one-third of TANF 
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leavers would potentially satisfy both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility criteria. Potential 
monthly UI benefits for this group would average about $866 per month, compared with 
maximum monthly TANF benefits of $424 for a family of three. Relaxing monetary eligibility 
requirements would modestly raise the share of TANF leavers who would qualify. Relaxing the 
weeks of work requirement has a greater effect than relaxing the earnings requirement. 
Alternative base period rules that consider more recent earnings would allow TANF leavers to 
qualify for UI faster, but the proportion qualifying would not increase much. 
Rangarajan and Razafindrakoto (2004) study the extent to which former welfare 
recipients would have monetary eligibility for UI if they were to experience a qualifying job 
separation. They use data from the national evaluation of the Welfare-to-Work Grants Program. 
The sample included those who left TANF for employment between September 1999 and August 
2000. Employment and earnings were tracked for eight calendar quarters after TANF exit. 
Sample sizes ranged between 1,000 and 15,000 welfare recipients who exited welfare for work in 
five sites: Maricopa County, Arizona; Cook County, Illinois; Baltimore County, Maryland; 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania; and Tarrant County, Texas. The authors estimate that 90 
percent would potentially attain UI monetary eligibility in the two-year period after TANF exit, 
while between 50 and 80 percent would qualify in any quarter during the two-year period. The 
rate of potential monetary eligibility was estimated to increase with the length of time from 
TANF exit to first jobless experience. Rates of expected monetary eligibility were not sensitive 
to changes in program eligibility rules. Changes examined included adjustments to consider 
more recent earnings when determining benefit eligibility and relaxing rules requiring 
availability for full-time work.  
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PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE USE OF ES BY WELFARE LEAVERS  
Before this study, there has not been research on the use of ES by TANF leavers in the 
United States. However, there has been recent research in Canada on the use of public 
employment services by leavers from social assistance. A Canadian field experiment found that 
financial incentives for leaving welfare alone did not result in significant reductions in 
dependency, but when combined with reemployment services the financial incentives yielded 
large and statistically significant reductions in rates of welfare receipt (Robins, Michalopolous, 
and Foley 2008). 
ELIGIBILITY FOR UNEMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE BENEFITS 
The introduction of TANF, with its lifetime limits and work requirements for continued 
receipt of cash assistance, meant that traditional employment and training programs would be 
key to self-sufficiency for TANF leavers. As background for the present research, I review UI 
and TANF eligibility rules in each of the four states analyzed.2 
UI Eligibility 
UI eligibility rules ensure that beneficiaries are strongly attached to the labor force and 
are temporarily jobless through no fault of their own. To initially qualify for UI, a claimant must 
have sufficient prior earnings and employment—these are called monetary eligibility conditions. 
Furthermore, the job separation must be involuntary. Nonmonetary eligibility rules prohibit quits 
and discharge for misconduct or other causes justifiable by an employer. Employer discharge for 
cause is usually related to frequent tardiness, unexplained absences, misconduct, or poor job 
2 This discussion relies on the exposition in O’Leary and Kline (2010) 
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performance.3 UI applicants must also be able, available, and actively seeking full time work. 
For initial and continuing eligibility, beneficiaries may not refuse an offer of suitable work. 
Monetary eligibility for UI is determined by base period earnings. The UI base period is 
normally the first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters before the date of claim 
for benefits.4 Table 2 lists the minimum base period earnings required to qualify for the 
minimum UI weekly benefit amount. For 2000, base period earnings requirements in the four 
states studied ranged from $1,872 in Georgia to $3,400 in Florida.5 
Monetary qualification for UI in many states requires earnings in the high calendar 
quarter of the base period to be above a specified level.6 Most states with a high-quarter earnings 
requirement also have an earnings dispersion requirement—all of the four states studied require 
earnings in at least two calendar quarters of the base period. Ohio is one of the few states in the 
nation with a base period employment requirement, and it is a very restrictive rule.7 The Ohio 
weeks of employment rule limits eligibility to those with at least 20 weeks of work in which 
earnings average at least 27.5 percent of the state average weekly wage in covered employment 
3 In the case of benefit denial due to voluntary quit or discharge for cause, the UI applicant may requalify for 
UI benefits in the following manner: in Florida, by earning 17 times the client’s weekly benefit amount (WBA); in 
Georgia, by earning 10 times the client’s WBA; in Michigan, by earning the lesser of 7 times the client’s WBA or 
280 times Michigan’s minimum wage (7 × 40 × MI minimum wage); and, in Ohio, by having six weeks of work in 
covered employment with the amount of wages in each week at least 27.5 percent of the state’s average weekly wage 
(USDOL 2001). 
4 For claimants not eligible based on earnings in the standard base period, earnings in an alternate base year 
(ABY)—the most recent four completed calendar quarters—is checked in Michigan and Ohio. Georgia does not have 
an ABY rule. An ABY amendment was considered by the 2002 Florida legislature but did not pass both houses. 
5 The base period earnings requirement is indexed to a multiple of the state average weekly wage  in UI-
covered employment or the state minimum wage in Michigan. The required level of earnings to qualify for UI is 
determined by legislative discretion in Florida, Georgia, and Ohio. In Georgia minimum required base period 
earnings are a multiple of the minimum weekly benefit amount. 
6 The minimum base period earnings level to qualify for UI is 1.5 times the minimum high-quarter earnings 
in Florida and Michigan. 
7 Three other states have employment requirements. New Jersey requires 20 weeks or a different earnings 
formula. Pennsylvania requires 16 weeks. The Washington rule requires 680 hours and one dollar of earnings. 
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(Table 2). For Ohio in 2000, a week of insured employment required earnings of at least $172, 
which is more than 33 hours of work at the federal minimum wage of $5.15 per hour. 
The studies summarized above suggest that TANF leavers would have a high probability 
of passing monetary eligibility requirements, but that nonmonetary eligibility requirements 
would eliminate a greater share of TANF leavers from UI eligibility. Regarding monetary 
eligibility, prior research has failed to recognize the importance of work hours requirements 
 
Table 2  Comparison of State Laws for UI and TANF for Program Year 2000 
 Florida Georgia Michigan Ohio 
UI minimum BPEa ($) 3,400 1,872 2,020 2,640 
UI-covered weeks of work   20 weeks at 30 x 
state minimum 
wage ($101) 
20 weeks at 
27.5% of Ohio 
AWW ($172) 
State AWWb ($) 578 668 726 624 
Avg. weekly benefit amount (WBA) ($) 220 212 244 236 
Minimum/maximum WBA ($) 32/275 39/264 87/300 77/279 
BPE required for max. WBA ($) 10,725 10,752 11,840 10,680 
Entitled duration (weeks) 26 12–26 15–26 20–26 
verage entitled duration (weeks) for 
TANF-leaver UI beneficiaries 
18.4 18.5 22.1 25.4 
Quit/discharge qualification 17 × WBA 10 × WBA Lesser of 7 × WBA 
or (7 × 40 × state 
minimum wage) 
6 weeks of wages 
at 27.5% of 
state AWW 
TANF earnings disregard ($) 200 plus 
50% of 
remainder 
120 plus one-third of 
remainder for 4 
months, $120 for 
next 8 months, 
$90 thereafter 
200 plus 20% of 
remainder 
250 plus 25% of 
remainder 
TANF monthly benefit c ($) 303 280 459 373 
TANF breakeven earningsd ($) 806 540/400/370 774 996 
a Base period earnings (BPE) is the sum of earnings in first four of the previous five completed calendar quarters. For 
Michigan, there is an alternative, flat requirement of 14 weeks of work and base period earnings that total 20 times the 
state’s average weekly wage. 
b State average weekly wage (AWW) earned by those working in UI-covered employment. 
c Family of three (one adult and two children with no income). 
d This is the point at which the TANF benefit is zero due to earnings. Breakeven earnings is computed as (TANF 
benefit amount) divided by (1 − disregard rate) plus the lump sum disregard 
SOURCE: TANF (2000, Tables 12:2, 12:5); ET Financial Data Handbook 394; Comparison of State Unemployment 




separate from earnings requirements, and there has been little prior direct evidence on the job 
separation patterns for recent TANF leavers. The present study does not examine the sensitivity 
of UI eligibility to a more recent base period for earnings computation or relaxing the 
requirement that job-seeking be for full-time work. Prior research suggests modest impacts on UI 
eligibility for TANF leavers from such changes (Vroman 1998). 
For those who qualify, UI pays benefits weekly; the cash amount increases with the level 
of prior earnings up to a state maximum. Table 2 lists the statewide average UI weekly benefit 
amounts. Also listed in Table 2 are average weekly wages of all workers covered by UI in 
calendar year 2000 in the states examined. This provides a sense of the average wage 
replacement rate provided by UI to regular full-time workers.  
TANF Eligibility 
Needy families with dependent children and earnings below the breakeven thresholds 
listed in Table 2 may have qualified for cash TANF assistance. States set maximum monthly 
TANF grant amounts and resource levels. Resource limits apply to liquid financial and vehicle 
assets. There are also employment requirements for continued TANF eligibility. Work is 
required immediately upon receipt of benefits in 28 states, within 6 months in 9 states, and 
within 24 months in 13 states. States also impose lifetime limits between 24 and 60 months on 
receipt of benefits (Department of Health and Human Services 2000). 
Regarding earnings, federal eligibility guidelines disregard a lump sum equal to the first 
$90 in earnings and one-third of other earnings up to the breakeven level of income, at which 
point the household has worked off TANF.8 Each state sets its own earnings disregard rate and 
8 Breakeven earnings are computed as the TANF benefit amount divided by (1 − disregard rate) plus the 
lump sum disregard. 
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lump sum. Some states have adjusted parameters to permit continued support with household 
income at thresholds as high as four times the poverty level. Statutory TANF benefit levels 
across our cohorts are quite similar for Florida and Georgia, while being somewhat higher in 
Michigan and Ohio (Table 2). Breakeven levels of earnings are similar in Florida, Michigan, and 
Ohio but are lower in Georgia; the level in Georgia declines after four and eight months of 
continuous receipt of benefits. 
For the present analysis, a key aspect of TANF eligibility is an administrative 
requirement that to qualify for additional cash public assistance, applicants must claim all other 
available sources of income, such as UI benefits. Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, and Corson (2002) 
note that New Jersey had such a rule in place under AFDC and continued to apply it under 
TANF. Similar administrative rules are in place in Georgia, Ohio, and Michigan. These rules 
could lower measured UI eligibility rates among TANF-leaver UI applicants. Some persons with 
little expectation of qualifying for UI may be forced to jump this hurdle on their way back to 
TANF.9 
The 2007 state TANF plan for Michigan, states that “clients must apply for other 
program benefits for which the group or a member of the group may be eligible, such as 
Supplemental Security Income, Social Security benefits or unemployment compensation.  
Failure to do so may result in group ineligibility (Michigan Department of Human Services 
2007, p. 11). 
Ohio administrative rules state that “the assistance group must apply for any monthly 
benefits to which it is entitled. Ineligibility to participate in Ohio Works First results if the 
9 Program administrators suspect that TANF applicants with very low prior earnings might not be directed to 
UI if failure to qualify under UI monetary eligibility rules is highly likely. 
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assistance group refuses to accept unconditionally available income.”10 Ohio Works First is the 
financial assistance portion of Ohio’s TANF program. It provides cash benefits to eligible needy 
families for up to 36 months. After that, a family cannot receive additional cash assistance unless 
a time extension for benefit receipt is approved by the relevant County Department of Job and 
Family Services official 
ES Eligibility and Services 
Public employment services in the United States are funded under the Wagner-Peyser 
Act, which established the ES in 1933. Services provided by the ES are delivered in one-stop 
centers under the Workforce Investment Act (WIA), and are available free of charge to all job 
seekers. There are four main categories of ES services: 
1) Job referrals. Job interview referrals for job seekers, job vacancy listings for 
employers, and job developers to link job seekers with employers. 
2) Job search assistance. Resume preparation help, job search workshops, job clubs, 
labor market information, and job search plans. 
3) Assessment services. Job interview practice, employment counseling, and testing 
for job aptitudes and of job skills. 
4) Training referrals. Referrals to federally or state-funded training for job skills or 
job search skills. Depending on available funding, some ES offices also offer supportive 
services for job search or training including temporary assistance with transportation or child 
care costs. Data available for analysis of ES use in this study are limited to Wagner-Peyser–
funded services during specific time periods in Georgia and Ohio. 
10 Administrative policy requiring claiming of UI is stated in the Ohio Department of Job and Family 
Services Cash Assistance Manual (ODJFS 2007, p. 350). 
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DATA FOR ANALYSIS  
TANF exit and use of UI were studied with administrative data from Florida, Georgia, 
Michigan, and Ohio. Access to administrative data on UI and TANF for Florida and Ohio was 
provided through the ADARE consortium supported by the U.S. Department of Labor. 
Additional data were provided by Georgia, Michigan, and Ohio directly to the Upjohn Institute 
under separate bilateral data sharing agreements.  
The samples for analysis include those voluntarily leaving TANF for employment. 
Samples exclude those who fail to receive a TANF cash payment because of a sanction or 
other involuntary reason. Because of the periodicity of some administrative data needed for 
the study, the time unit for analysis is the calendar quarter. Because of the uneven time 
periods for data available across the states, the sample time frames differ somewhat across 
the states. All were drawn from the time shortly after TANF was enacted in 1996. Key 
concepts in the analysis are as follows: 
TANF exit for employment is defined as making zero cash TANF payment to the 
assistance unit in a calendar quarter and having earnings of at least $100 in that calendar 
quarter or the next quarter. The zero payment must not be due to a sanction. 
Employment is defined as earnings of at least $100 in a calendar quarter. This 
definition is the same as that applied by the Social Security Administration when measuring the 
duration of insured employment to determine eligibility for retirement benefits. 
Unemployment is defined as a calendar quarter with earnings of less than $100. 
All three of these concepts are measured using UI administrative records on earnings as 
reported quarterly by employers. The definition of unemployment is a very strict one and 
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certainly understates the true extent of experience with joblessness in the samples. 
The state-specific TANF exit time frames (quarters) are as follows: 
Florida: 1998Q4–2001Q1 (10 quarters), 
Georgia: 1996Q2–2001Q4 (23 quarters), 
Michigan: 2001Q1–2002Q1 (5 quarters),  
Ohio: 2000Q2–2001Q3 (6 quarters). 
Each of these time frames permits observation of UI claims and possible return to 
TANF for at least 12 calendar quarters after TANF exit. The sample sizes for TANF leavers 
analyzed are listed in Table 3. The four-state total sample size is 322,038. These data include 
adult grantees in TANF recipient households who left TANF for employment and represent a 
census of TANF leavers in the four states during the years included. 
 
Table 3 Summary of New Joblessness and UI Application among TANF Leavers 
 Florida Georgia Michigan Ohio Pooled 
TANF leavers 59,726 152,278 27,172 82,860 322,036 
Newly jobless 46,245 123,701 21,043 62,200 253,189 
UI applicants 18,309 27,257 4,776 11,116 61,458 
Monetarily-eligible for UI benefits 17,331 24,294 4,687 7,256 53,568 
Nonmonetarily-eligible for UIa,b  8,406 13,100 1,874 3,498 26,878 
UI beneficiaries 11,095 13,389 3,097 3,339 30,920 
Newly jobless rate 0.774 0.812 0.774 0.751 0.786 
UI application rate 0.396 0.220 0.227 0.179 0.243 
Monetary-eligibility rate 0.947 0.891 0.981 0.653 0.872 
Nonmonetary-eligibility rate 0.459 0.481 0.392 0.315 0.437 
UI beneficiary rate 0.606 0.491 0.648 0.300 0.503 
NOTE: Twelve quarters of data are available after TANF exit to check for the occurrence of new joblessness, UI application, 
eligibility, and benefit receipt for UI applications that occur from one quarter before new joblessness through three quarters 
after.  
a The number of persons UI ineligible because of quits or employer discharge was imputed in the Georgia data using the quit and 
discharge rates in a subsample of 26,610 UI applicants with data on job separation reason. 
b Ohio nonmonetary eligibility is based on claims filed on or before December 31, 2002. Claims beginning in 2003 did not 
include data on claimant characteristics needed to define nonmonetary eligibility.  
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INCIDENCE OF JOBLESSNESS AND UI APPLICATION 
Among TANF leavers, 253,189 experienced a new spell of joblessness within three years 
after leaving TANF. The cumulative rates of joblessness ranged from 75.1 to 81.2 percent in the 
states with a weighted mean cumulative joblessness rate of 78.6 percent in the four-state pooled 
data (Table 3, Figure 1). The pooled data on newly jobless TANF leavers include a population 
that is 37 percent youth, 58 percent prime-age, 82 percent female, 36 percent white, 59 percent 
African American, and 4 percent Hispanic. Average quarterly earnings in the three years before 
TANF exit were $1,793, and average quarterly earnings from TANF exit to new joblessness 
were $2,239 (Appendix Table A.1). 
 
The UI application rates ranged from 17.9 to 39.6 percent of newly jobless in the four 
states within three years after leaving TANF (Table 3, Figure 1). The mean rate in the pooled 
data from all four states is 24.3 percent. Given the low average earnings level for the TANF 
leavers, this UI application rate compares reasonably with the 34.5 percent reported by Vroman 
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(2008, p. 5) based on a Current Population Survey supplement on unemployed UI nonfilers. 
Vroman also reports that the main reasons jobless people did not apply for UI were the belief 
that prior earnings were insufficient to qualify or that the job separation was due to a 
disqualifying reason, such as a job quit or employer discharge for cause (p. 23). Administrative 
data from Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Ohio suggest that, compared to nonapplicants, newly 
jobless TANF leavers who apply for UI include higher proportions who are of prime age, are 
African American, have dependent children, have higher earnings before UI application, have 
more prior work experience (Appendix Table A.1).  
UI ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT RECEIPT 
 The general rules for monetary and nonmonetary eligibility for UI benefits are 
summarized above. This section examines the rates of achieving these requirements in the 
samples examined in this study and the rate of UI benefit receipt. 
UI Monetary Eligibility  
Among TANF leavers who become newly jobless and apply for UI benefits, 87.2 percent 
were initially eligible for UI based on monetary requirements in the four-state pooled data (Table 
3, Figure 2). The rates of monetary eligibility range from 65.3 percent of the Ohio sample to 98.1 
of the Michigan sample. The lower monetary eligibility rates in Ohio result from the strict 
requirement for 20 or more weeks of work with average earnings being at least 27.5 percent of 
the state average weekly wage in UI-covered employment.  
15 
 
UI Nonmonetary Eligibility  
In addition to having sufficient levels of prior employment and earnings, applicants for 
UI must also have separated involuntarily from their previous jobs and must be currently able, 
available, and actively seeking work. In the sample of UI applicants pooled across four states, the 
rate of nonmonetary eligibility is 43.7 percent. Rates for individual states range from 31.5 
percent in Ohio to 48.1 percent in Georgia (Table 3, Figure 2). For TANF leavers, higher rates of 
voluntary job quits and justifiable dismissals result in lower rates of nonmonetary eligibility.  
Receipt of UI Benefits  
Among TANF leavers who are UI applicants, the proportions receiving UI benefits in the 
states examined range from 30.0 percent in Ohio to 64.8 percent in Michigan (Table 3, Figure 2). 
The overall mean rate of benefit receipt was 50.3 percent in the sample pooled across four states. 
Among TANF leavers who qualify for UI, mean weekly benefit amounts are $159, mean entitled 
durations of UI benefits are 19.6 weeks, and on average 74.6 percent of entitled UI benefits are 
drawn (Table 4). Mean UI payments are $2,442 over the full benefit year, or a mean of 14.5 
Figure 2 Rates of UI Monetary Eligibility, Nonmonetary Eligibility, 












Florida Georgia Michigan Ohio Pooled 
Monetarily-eligible rate Nonmonetarily-eligible rate UI beneficiary rate 
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weeks of UI at the average weekly benefit amount for this sample. Benefit entitlements are fully 
exhausted by 53.2 percent of TANF-leaver UI beneficiaries.  
 
Table 4  Summary of UI Entitlement, Benefit Receipt, and Exhaustion 
 Florida Georgia Michigan Ohio Pooled 
Weeks of UI entitlement 18.4 18.4 22.1 25.4 19.6 
Weeks of UI drawna  14.7 12.6 18.7 18.0 14.5 
Share of UI entitlement drawn 0.798 0.689 0.843 0.709 0.746 
UI exhaustion rate 0.610 0.497 0.556 0.383 0.532 
UI weekly benefit amount ($) 165 145 201 157 159 
UI compensation received in benefit year ($) 2,528 1,959 3,806 2,824 2,442 
UI monthly amount receivedb ($) 535 411 683 453 487 
TANF monthly amount receivedc ($) 134 165 199 225 164 
Ratio of mean UI to mean TANF 4.0 2.5 3.4 2.0 3.1 
a This is full-time equivalent weeks of UI computed as total dollars of UI benefits received divided by the beneficiary’s UI 
weekly benefit amount (WBA) for joblessness throughout a full week. 
b Computed as benefit year dollars of UI divided by maximum entitled weeks of UI benefits times four. 
c TANF payments received in the two calendar quarters completed prior to TANF exit divided by six. 
 
TANF LEAVERS’ UI USE COMPARED TO OTHERS  
Comparing TANF leavers to those not recently involved with TANF in the combined 
sample pooled across all four states, simple differences between the two groups reveal lower 
rates of monetary eligibility, nonmonetary eligibility, and benefit receipt for TANF leavers 
compared to all other UI applicants in the same time periods (Table 5). Simple unadjusted 
comparisons reveal similar rates of monetary eligibility in three of the four states, the exception 
being Ohio, where TANF leavers have a lower rate of monetary eligibility because of Ohio’s 
strict requirement for prior earnings. Nonmonetary eligibility is lower for TANF leavers in all 
states, with the greatest difference being in Michigan. Rates of UI benefit receipt are lower in 
every state for recent TANF leavers compared to other UI applicants, with differences in the rate 
of receipt ranging from 10.5 percentage points in Florida to 36.5 percentage points in Ohio. 
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Table 5  UI Monetary Eligibility, Non-Monetary Eligibility and Benefit Receipt Summary Comparing Newly 




Simple difference Regression adjusted 
Difference 
Standard 
Error T-statistic Difference 
Standard 
Error T-statistic TANF Non-TANFa 
Monetary eligibility rate 
 Florida 0.947 0.906 0.041 0.002 18.88 0.052 0.002 26.53 
 Georgia 0.891 0.903 −0.011 0.002 −6.32 0.028 0.002 18.12 
 Michigan 0.981 0.985 −0.004 0.002 −2.06 0.000 0.001 0.87 
 Ohio 0.653 0.844 −0.191 0.003 −55.22 −0.216 0.005 −41.60 
 Pooled 0.872 0.913 −0.041 0.001 −36.07 0.036 0.001 38.27 
Nonmonetary eligibility rate 
 Florida 0.459 0.629 −0.170 0.004 −47.42 −0.105 0.004 −28.95 
 Georgia 0.481 0.625 −0.145 0.003 −48.44 −0.056 0.003 −16.70 
 Michigan 0.392 0.789 −0.396 0.006 −66.96 −0.187 0.006 −33.72 
 Ohiob 0.315 0.465 −0.150 0.005 −27.67 −0.070 0.005 −13.24 
 Pooledc 0.442 0.654 −0.211 0.002 −106.73 −0.111 0.003 −43.03 
Quit         
 Florida 0.201 0.112 0.089 0.002 37.75 0.054 0.002 22.94 
 Georgia 0.174 0.132 0.042 0.002 20.00 0.015 0.002 6.44 
 Michigan 0.174 0.069 0.105 0.004 28.56 0.036 0.004 9.90 
 Ohiob 0.105 0.041 0.063 0.002 29.18 0.033 0.002 14.53 
 Pooledc 0.172 0.094 0.079 0.001 64.83 0.038 0.001 31.45 
Fired/discharged        
 Florida 0.340 0.259 0.081 0.003 25.04 0.051 0.003 15.13 
 Georgia 0.345 0.243 0.103 0.003 38.85 0.041 0.003 13.55 
 Michigan 0.434 0.142 0.291 0.005 57.47 0.151 0.005 30.33 
 Ohiob 0.209 0.081 0.127 0.003 42.65 0.070 0.003 23.30 
 Pooledc 0.331 0.192 0.139 0.002 84.47 0.070 0.002 42.48 
UI beneficiary rate 
 Florida 0.606 0.711 −0.105 0.003 −31.16 −0.027 0.003 −8.10 
 Georgia 0.491 0.690 −0.199 0.003 −70.67 −0.028 0.003 −9.02 
 Michigan 0.648 0.866 −0.217 0.005 −43.93 −0.044 0.004 −10.13 
 Ohio 0.300 0.665 −0.365 0.004 −81.29 −0.233 0.010 −23.04 
 Pooled 0.503 0.732 −0.229 0.002 −127.42 −0.131 0.002 −77.81 
a Non-TANF UI applicants do not appear at any point in the individual state TANF payments file and the time period of UI 
claims selected for non-TANF persons is consistent with the periods in which TANF recipients leave TANF for employment 
and become newly unemployed. 
b Estimates for Ohio are based on UI claims filed on or before December 31, 2002. New UI data received in December 2007 for 
claims filed from 2003 through 2005 did not include characteristic data needed to define quit and discharge or to derive 
regression-adjusted estimates. 
c Pooled, regression-adjusted estimates across states control for age, gender, education, race, employment history in the three 
years prior to filing, wages in the base period, weekly benefit amount, unemployment rate at filing, industry of prior 
employment, and year and quarter of filing. 
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The pattern changes somewhat when comparisons are made while controlling for 
differences in observable characteristics (Table 5). Variables available as controls for 
comparisons are age, gender, race, ethnicity, family size, prior earnings, and prior employment 
patterns. Controlling for observable characteristics of UI applicants by regression models in 
computing differences, we see that TANF leavers have higher rates of UI monetary eligibility, 
given their circumstances, than other UI applicants. However, rates of nonmonetary eligibility 
and benefit receipt remain lower for TANF leavers even after controlling for observable 
differences in characteristics between the two groups. Failure to meet nonmonetary eligibility 
requirements is the main reason for lower rates of UI benefit receipt by TANF leavers in all four 
states. Rates of voluntary job leaving are higher for TANF leavers than for other UI applicants in 
all states examined (Table 5). 
Regarding the reasons for higher rates failing nonmonetary eligibility requirements by 
TANF leavers in the pooled four-state sample, 17.2 percent of TANF leaver UI applicants 
voluntarily quit their prior jobs, compared to only 9.4 percent of other UI applicants. The 
difference of 7.9 percentage points means TANF leavers quit at almost double the rate of other 
UI applicants not recently involved with TANF (Table 5). A similar pattern is seen in rates of 
justifiable employer dismissals in the four-state pooled sample. Among non-TANF leaver UI 
applicants, 19.2 percent were fired from their prior jobs, while 33.1 percent of TANF leavers had 
been fired. Controlling for observable characteristics, TANF leavers were 3.8 percentage points 
more likely to quit and 7.0 percentage points more likely to get fired than other similar UI 
applicants (Table 5). That is, even when TANF leavers are compared to others having similar 
average age, gender, race, ethnicity, family size, prior earnings, and prior employment patterns; 
recent TANF leavers are still more likely to quit or get fired from their prior jobs. 
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In the pooled sample of 30,775 TANF leavers who become UI beneficiaries, the average 
duration of receipt was 14.5 weeks over the benefit year, with an average exhaustion rate of 53.2 
percent (Table 6). Compared to all other 6.465 million UI beneficiaries in the four states in the 
same time frame, TANF leavers on average drew 2.0 more weeks of UI and had an exhaustion 
rate 25.4 percentage points higher. This same pattern was observed for each state separately, 
with the largest differences occurring in Michigan (5.8 weeks, 33.6 percentage points) and 
smallest in Florida (0.5 weeks, 17.8 percentage points). Controlling for observable factors, 
TANF leavers were estimated to draw 3.0 weeks more and to have exhausted their full benefit 
entitlements at a rate 17.2 percentage points higher than in an observationally comparable group 
of those not recently involved with TANF. 
Table 6  Comparison of UI Duration and Exhaustion among Newly Unemployed TANF-Leaver UI 
Beneficiaries with All Other UI Beneficiaries Not Recently Involved with TANFa 
 TANF leaver Non-TANF Simple 
difference 
Adjusted 
difference Sample size Mean Sample size Mean 
Full-time equivalent weeks       
Florida 11,079 14.7 1,439,720 14.2 0.5** 2.2** 
Georgia 13,387 12.6 1,727,387 10.4 2.2** 1.9** 
Michiganb 3,091 18.7 1,962,584 12.9 5.8** 2.7** 
Ohiob 3,218 18.0 1,335,721 13.0 5.1** 4.7** 
Pooledc 30,775 14.5 6,465,412 12.5 2.0** 3.0** 
Exhausted benefits       
Florida 11,079 0.610 1,439,720 0.432 0.178** 0.151** 
Georgia 13,387 0.497 1,727,387 0.277 0.220** 0.130** 
Michiganb 3,091 0.556 1,962,584 0.220 0.336** 0.173** 
Ohiob 3,218 0.383 1,335,721 0.190 0.193** 0.198** 
Pooledc 30,775 0.532 6,465,412 0.277 0.254** 0.172** 
NOTE: ** Significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test. 
a To allow for complete benefit-year information, claims must have occurred before the end of the second quarter of 2004 in 
Florida and the second quarter of 2005 for Georgia and Michigan. Benefit year data are complete for Ohio for all claims 
observed. 
b In Michigan and Ohio, the number of persons with nonzero UI compensation received in the benefit year is greater than the 
number of persons for whom we observe nonzero weekly benefit amount (WBA) or maximum benefits payable. Because of this, 
the sample size for which full-time equivalent weeks and exhaustion are observed is 3,091 for Michigan and 3,218 for Ohio. 
c Right-side variables in pooled models limited by characteristic data available for Ohio. The pooled model includes variables 
for the states, weekly benefit amount (WBA), WBA at maximum, base period earnings, employment history in the three years 
prior to UI filing and dummies for the year and quarter of UI filing. State-specific models for Florida, Georgia, and Michigan use 
a broader set of explanatory variables that differ between states. 
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UI AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY  
A goal of UI as social insurance is to prevent descent into poverty by those who are 
temporarily jobless through no fault of their own (Blaustein 1990, pp. 44–46). Among the newly 
jobless TANF leavers in the four-state pooled sample, 77.5 percent returned to employment, but 
36.4 percent returned to TANF (Figure 3).11 Following is a correlation analysis of the influence 
of UI benefit receipt on returning to employment or TANF. Naturally, in a period after 
joblessness some TANF leaver UI applicants both worked and received additional TANF 
benefits.  
To measure the correlation between UI benefit receipt and return to employment or 
TANF, linear probability models were estimated controlling for observable differences among 
UI applicants. Models for both binary outcomes have the same general form, including binary 
indicator control variables for monetary eligibility, nonmonetary eligibility, benefit receipt, and 
whether the entitlement is at the state maximum weekly benefit amount. The complete list of 
other UI program, demographic, and labor market control variables are listed in the notes to 
Table 7, which presents results from estimation of models on the samples of TANF leaver UI 
applicants pooled across all four states. Controlling for observable characteristics, receipt of UI 
is estimated to increase return to employment by 4.8 percentage points and to reduce return to 
TANF by 10.5 percentage points compared to nonbeneficiary UI applicants.12 
 
11 Using data from all four states, we have 12 calendar quarters after TANF exit for employment to observe 
joblessness, UI application, and return to employment and/or TANF. Regression-adjusted results discussed below 
control for the variation across individuals in the time from TANF exit to joblessness.  
12 O’Leary and Kline (2010) report on several attempts to correct for the endogeniety of UI benefit receipt 
as a predictor of employment and return to TANF. Various corrections did not significantly change impact 
estimates.  
21 
                                                 
 
To investigate whether UI receipt affects return to employment or TANF differently for 
those who exhaust their UI entitlement compared to beneficiaries who do not exhaust their 
entitlement, the single UI beneficiary binary variable was replaced by a pair of indicator 
variables, one for nonexhaustee beneficiaries and the other for exhaustees of their UI benefit 
entitlement. The results summarized in Table 7 suggest that the effect of UI benefit receipt on 
return to employment declines with the duration of benefit receipt. That is, among nonexhaustees 
UI receipt increases return to employment by 8.2 percentage points, whereas the effect for UI 
exhaustees is only 1.7 percentage points. The correlation between UI receipt and a reduced rate 
of return to TANF is greatly diminished for UI exhausters. In the sample pooled across the four 
states, UI receipt reduces return to TANF by 14 percentage points for nonexhaustees but by only 
7.2 percentage points for exhausters of their UI entitlement. 
Table 7  Correlation of UI Benefit Receipt with Return to Employment or TANF among Newly Unemployed 
TANF-Leaver UI Applicants Using Administrative Data from Florida, Georgia, Michigan, and Ohio 
 
Independent variables 













Pooled across all states       
UI beneficiaries 0.048 0.004 11.11 -0.105 0.005 -20.69 
UI beneficiaries—not exhaustees 0.082 0.005 15.93 -0.140 0.006 -23.22 
UI exhausteesa 0.017 0.005 3.38 -0.072 0.006 -12.33 
State specific models       
UI beneficiaries, Florida 0.060 0.009 6.93 -0.079 0.010 -8.23 
UI beneficiaries, Georgia 0.048 0.006 7.71 -0.097 0.008 -12.98 
UI beneficiaries, Michigan 0.023 0.015 1.52 -0.094 0.018 -5.25 
UI beneficiaries, Ohio 0.091 0.011 8.67 -0.151 0.012 -12.63 
aParameter estimates for UI exhaustees are significantly different from estimates for other UI beneficiaries who do not exhaust UI 
entitlement in both models at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test. Parameter estimates from linear probability 
regression models on TANF leaver UI applicants with covariates to control for observable differences between nonbeneficiary UI 
applicants and various categories of UI beneficaries. In O’Leary and Kline (2010), see Table 4.2 for the pooled linear probablity 
models, Appendix Tables A.12–A.15 for all parameter estimates in the full state specific models and for nonexhaustee 
beneficiaries and UI exhaustees, and Table A.16 for the full model with indicators for UI exhaustees and UI beneficiary 
nonexhaustees. State models include all control variables available from the following list: UI eligibility and entitlement amount 
and duration, age, sex, race, educational attainment, base period earnings, duration of employment before UI application, time 
from TANF exit to joblessness, if more than one base period employer, prior industry group of employment, prior occupational 
group, county unemployment rate at time of TANF exit, percentage change in unemployment rate from TANF exit to UI 
application, quarters of TANF receipt in the 2 years before TANF exit, eligibility for extended UI benefits, UI job search 
exemption, completed WPRS profiling, does not have a telephone number, child support payment withheld from UI check, year 
and quarter of UI application, and county of residence.  
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The state-specific models of return to employment and TANF suggest that in our 
unweighted pooled regression models the large samples from Georgia dominate. The state-
specific effect estimates for Georgia on both outcomes are not significantly different from the 
pooled estimate, and both parameter estimates for Florida are consistent with the pooled results 
having similar sign, magnitude, and significance. The strongest response to UI benefit receipt on 
both outcomes is seen for Ohio, the state where UI receipt requires the strongest demonstration 
of labor force attachment. Relative to the estimate for the pooled sample, Ohio UI recipients 
have nearly double the odds of becoming reemployed, and are 50 percent less likely to return to 
TANF.13 Compared to the other three states, UI receipt in Michigan correlated with similar 
reductions in return to TANF, but the weaker results for reemployment in Michigan reflect the 
severe slack in labor markets during the period.  
By interacting return to employment with return to TANF we get a much more 
informative view of how UI receipt is correlated with self-sufficiency—return to employment 
without return to TANF. In our sample of newly unemployed TANF leavers pooled across four 
states, 47.6 percent remain self-sufficient in the 12 calendar quarters after TANF exit. In this 
section we examine the correlation of UI receipt with all of the four possible combinations of 
employment and TANF receipt outcomes as summarized in the two-by-two matrix given as 
Figure 3. In addition to the concept of self-sufficiency, we label employed with return to TANF 
as working poor (29.9 percent), no employment with return to TANF as TANF-dependent (6.5), 
and no employment with no return to TANF as inactive (16.0). The row totals in Figure 3 show 
13 The results reported here are best regarded as descriptive of observed correlations. O’Leary and Kline 
(2010) investigated a variety of strategies to correct for sample selection in these analyses, but produced no 
convincing results. A focused regression discontinuity analysis by Leung and O’Leary (forthcoming) is more 
promising.  
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the overall rate of returning to employment or not in the pooled four-state sample, while the 
column totals show the overall rates of returning to TANF or not. 
 
Figure 3  Self-Sufficiency Matrix:  Return to TANF and Employment within a Year among Newly 
Unemployed TANF Leavers (percentages) 
 No TANF TANF Totals 
Employment 47.6 (Self-sufficiency) 
29.9 
(Working poor) 77.5 
No employment 16.0 (Inactive) 
6.5 
(TANF dependent) 22.5 
Totals 63.6 36.4 100.0 
 
To measure the correlation between UI benefit receipt and the four measures of self- 
sufficiency controlling for observable differences, I estimated linear probability models on each 
of the four separate outcomes as summarized in Table 8. Controlling for observable 
characteristics, compared to nonrecipient UI applicants, I estimate that UI beneficiaries are 12.0 
percentage points more likely to be self-sufficient, 7.2 percentage points less likely to be working 
poor, 3.2 percentage points less likely to be TANF-dependent, and 1.5 percentage points less 
likely to be inactive.  
Parameter estimates on covariates in Table 8 suggest that self-sufficiency (employment 
without TANF) is most likely among those who are of prime age for the labor market (aged 25–
49), male, white, with employment in more quarters before UI application, those with multiple 
employers in at least one of their UI base period quarters, and those with recent prior 
employment in the industries of agriculture, manufacturing, and administrative support, and in 
areas where joblessness is lower. Results also suggest that the working poor (employment with 
TANF) are most likely younger workers (under 25), female, and African American; have more  
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Table 8 Rates of Self-Sufficiency after New Unemployment among UI Applicants 
Return-to-employment status Employed, Employed, Not employed, Not employed, 
Return-to-TANF status no TANF TANF TANF no TANF 
 Self-sufficient Working poor TANF-dependent Inactive 
UI applicants 
UI beneficiaries  
UI nonbeneficiaries  


















Effects of independent variables on outcomes 
Age 24 or less  
Age 25–49 























Race, white  
Race, black  


















4 or fewer qtrs. employment pre-BYB  
5–8 qtrs. employment pre-BYB 













Qtrs. from TANF exit to unemployment 









Agriculture, forestry, fishing  
Manufacturing 
Wholesale trade  
Retail trade 
Administrative support waste mgmt.  
Health care/social assistance 
Art, entertainment, recreation  

































Unemployment rate, month of BYB 





























NOTE: This table summarizes results presented in Tables 4.5 and A.23. BYB = Benefit year begin date; BYE = Benefit year 
ending date. 
* Statistically significant in a two-tailed test at the 90 percent confidence level; ** statistically significant in a two-tailed test 
at the 95 percent confidence level. 
SOURCE: Table 4.6 in O’Leary and Kline (2010, p. 56). 
 
 
quarters of employment before UI application; have multiple employers in at least one UI base 
period quarter; are recently employed in the hospitality industry; and are located in areas with 
higher unemployment rates. Parameters in Table 8 suggest TANF dependency (TANF but no 
employment) is most likely among those aged 50 and over, female, with few quarters of 
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employment before UI application, and those in high unemployment areas. Finally the results 
suggest that inactivity (neither employment nor TANF) is most likely for those aged 50 and over, 
male, not African American, those having fewer calendar quarters with earnings before UI 
application, having new joblessness longer after TANF exit, and those in low unemployment 
areas. 
USE OF THE PUBLIC ES BY JOBLESS TANF LEAVERS  
The public ES in the United States is funded through the Wagner-Peyser Act. One-stop 
career centers operating under the Workforce Investment Act deliver reemployment services 
divided into three increasing levels of service: core, intensive, and training. The core and 
intensive services at one-stops are commonly delivered by the ES with Wagner-Peyser funding. 
Participants typically use core services before progressing to intensive or training services. The 
ES and UI systems are closely linked by the work test for continued UI benefit eligibility 
(O’Leary 2006). The work test is administered by the ES. Using data from Georgia and Ohio, I 
examine the use of Wagner-Peyser–funded ES services by newly jobless TANF leavers and 
measure the correlations between ES services usage and labor market outcomes, controlling for 
the degree of UI involvement. 
Evidence from these two states suggests that about one-quarter of newly jobless TANF 
leavers use public ES services. Among these, sizable numbers of UI nonapplicants use ES 
services, but usage rates are significantly higher among UI applicants. Importantly, ES services 
usage rates are similar between UI beneficiaries and nonbeneficiary UI applicants. This suggests 
that application for UI is a pathway to reemployment services provided by the ES even if cash UI 
benefits are not forthcoming.  
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Usage rates for any core or intensive service in Georgia are shown in Figure 4, together 
with usage rates for the most popular core and intensive type services in Ohio. The figure shows 
that in Georgia 14 percent of UI nonapplicants receive at least one core ES service after new 
joblessness, while a core service was used by 78 percent of UI beneficiaries and 77 percent of 
UI-ineligible applicants. The core service called “job seeker match” in Ohio was used by 8 
percent of UI nonapplicants, 45 percent of UI beneficiaries, and 48 percent of ineligible UI 
applicants. While usage rates are lower across the board for intensive services, a similar pattern 
of usage can be seen in both states across the UI usage groups (Figure 4). A key contrast is the 
substantially higher rate of usage for both core and intensive services by ineligible UI applicants 
compared to UI nonapplicants. 
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EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, RETURN TO EMPLOYMENT, AND TANF  
For our samples of newly jobless TANF leavers in Georgia and Ohio, statistical analysis 
suggests that public ES services help to maintain connections with employment opportunities, 
particularly through job interview referrals for the working poor. This appears to be true 
regardless of the degree of involvement with UI. Also, despite the fact that UI applicants use ES 
services more often, this result still holds for UI nonapplicants. Additionally there is evidence 
that receipt of job interview referrals through the ES reduces rates of complete TANF 
dependency and inactivity.  
Our measurement of correlations between service receipt and outcomes is affected by the 
time frames available for observation. Since core services are likely to be received earlier in a 
jobless spell than intensive services, there is a better chance to observe a positive outcome for 
core services. In particular, job interview referrals are most quickly dispensed, and their effects 
are more immediate than other services. Participation in intensive services happens only after 
exhausting more immediate reemployment opportunities offered by core services. Consequently 
there is less time to observe reemployment and earnings activity for intensive service recipients. 
In regression models of ES services effects, the largest estimates are for the most popular 
core service: job referrals (Table 9). In Georgia, job referrals boost reemployment rates by 6.5, 
4.9, and 10.7 percentage points, respectively, for UI nonapplicants, UI beneficiaries, and 
nonbeneficiary UI applicants. Job referrals impact estimates are also positive and significant on 
employment in Ohio for all three UI involvement groups. The point estimates are 5.7, 8.3, and 
4.6 percentage points in increased employment rates, respectively, for UI nonapplicants, UI 
beneficiaries, and nonbeneficiary UI applicants.  
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Table 9  Marginal Effects of Job Referrals (Core) and Job Search Planning (Intensive) Services on Return to 
Employment and TANF among Newly Jobless TANF Leavers in Georgia (GA) and Ohio (OH) 
Employment Service 











Job interview referrals (GA) 0.065** 0.049** 0.107** 0.061** 0.035** 0.032** 
Job interview referrals (OH) 0.057** 0.083** 0.046** 0.026** 0.078** 0.032 
 
Customer service plan (GA) −0.020 −0.033 −0.036* −0.010 0.041 0.014 
Job search planning (OH) −0.005 −0.016 0.007 −0.032* 0.022 −0.028 
 
Employment Service 
Employment and no TANF 
(Self-sufficient) 












Job interview referrals (GA) −0.013** 0.009 0.047** 0.077** 0.040** 0.061** 
Job interview referrals (OH) 0.021* −0.001 0.018 0.036** 0.084** 0.028 
 
Customer service plan (GA) −0.017 −0.047 −0.036 −0.003 0.014 0.000 
Job search planning (OH) 0.014 −0.025 0.020 −0.019 0.008 −0.014 
 
Employment Service 
No employment, no TANF 
(Inactive) 












Job interview referrals (GA) −0.048** −0.044** −0.078** −0.017** −0.005 −0.029** 
Job interview referrals (OH) −0.047** −0.077** −0.050** −0.010 −0.006 0.004 
 
Customer service plan (GA) 0.027** 0.005 0.023 −0.007 0.027** 0.013 
Job search planning (OH) 0.019 0.003 0.008 −0.014 0.014 −0.015 
 
NOTE: * significantly different from zero at the 90 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test; ** significantly different from zero 
at the 95 percent confidence level in a two-tailed test. 
 
 
Statistical analysis also suggests a positive correlation between ES job referrals and 
return to TANF in both Georgia and Ohio. These results reflect the fact that many in these 
groups remain poor despite working. These people are struggling to maintain adequate income 
from multiple sources, which may often mean combining income from earnings and TANF. The 
parameter estimates suggest that the core ES job referrals may be particularly useful for the 
working poor. I find significant positive correlations between use of ES services and return to 
work among those who continue to rely on TANF.  
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A uniformly favorable result following job referrals is a reduction in inactivity for all 
newly jobless TANF leavers. Inactivity means a lack of involvement with either employment or 
TANF. For Georgia, job referrals are measured as reducing inactivity by 4.8, 4.4, and 7.8 
percentage points, respectively, for UI nonapplicants, UI beneficiaries, and nonbeneficiary UI 
applicants. For Ohio, estimates of the same effects were 4.7, 7.7, and 5.0 percentage points. 
Among all effect estimates for job referrals, results are particularly encouraging for 
nonbeneficiary UI applicants. The largest positive effects on employment and self-sufficiency 
(employment without TANF) are measured for these newly jobless TANF leavers who use the 
ES at dramatically higher rates than UI nonapplicants.  
Few of the intensive services in Georgia and Ohio are measured to have statistically 
significant effects on employment and return to TANF. The Georgia intensive service called 
“customer service plan” is similar to the Ohio service called “job search planning.” Neither has a 
significant effect on employment or TANF for UI beneficiaries, but the respective programs 
measurably reduce return to TANF for UI nonapplicants in Ohio while modestly reducing the 
rate of return to employment for nonbeneficiary UI applicants in Georgia. The latter result may 
be due to the fact that customer service plans occur later in job search spells, permitting less time 
to observe return to employment in our restricted measurement period.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 changed 
welfare in the United States by establishing TANF. This law introduced lifetime limits on cash 
assistance and established work requirements for TANF cash benefits eligibility. These changes 
increased the importance of public employment and training programs for maintaining self-
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sufficiency after TANF exit. Key among these programs are UI, which provides temporary 
partial wage replacement to the involuntarily jobless, and the ES, which provides job matching 
and other reemployment services. 
Using program data from the ADARE consortium, I examine the rates at which adults in 
households recently receiving TANF become jobless, apply for and receive UI benefits, and 
participate in publicly funded employment services. I also investigate the correlation between UI 
and employment services receipt with maintenance of self-sufficiency through return to work 
and independence from TANF. The analysis is based on person-level administrative program 
records from four of the nine most populous states between 1997 and 2003: Florida, Georgia, 
Michigan, and Ohio.  
The data suggest that three-quarters of new TANF leavers experience joblessness within 
three years, and one-quarter of the newly jobless apply for UI benefits. About 87 percent of UI 
applicants have sufficient prior earnings to qualify for UI benefits; however, only about 44 
percent qualify based on their job separation reasons. Among all UI applicants, TANF leavers 
were found to have much higher rates of voluntary quits and employer dismissals than non-
TANF leavers. About half of newly jobless TANF leavers who apply for UI end up getting 
benefits. Among TANF leavers who become jobless and apply for and receive UI, the rate of 
return to employment is higher and the rate of return to TANF is lower for those who receive UI 
benefits. These patterns of UI and self-sufficiency are strongest in Ohio, which has the highest 
prior work requirements for UI eligibility among the four states. However, the Ohio shares of 
newly unemployed TANF leavers who apply for and receive UI benefits are lowest among the 
four states.  
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Using data from Georgia and Ohio I examined usage of Wagner-Peyser–funded public 
employment services, and the correlation between service receipt and measures of self-
sufficiency. In these two states, public employment services are used by about one-quarter of 
newly jobless TANF leavers. Among TANF leaver UI applicants, more than 75 percent use 
public employment services whether they receive UI benefits or not, but only 14 percent of 
newly jobless TANF leavers who do not apply for UI choose to use public employment services. 
So that application for UI appears to connect newly jobless TANF leavers with public 
employment services.  
Welfare caseloads have declined dramatically since TANF was introduced in 1996. It is 
undeniable that TANF changed welfare as we knew it. Although caseloads have nearly vanished, 
need remains. Former TANF recipients and others vulnerable to welfare dependency are turning 
to multiple sources to replace cash public assistance. The roles of UI and ES services for low-
income Americans in a post-TANF economy should be better understood. This paper provides 
some of the first evidence on the degree to which this population is served under current 
arrangements. Employment policy is the new welfare policy. As additional work requirements 
are added to various parts of the social safety net, research should continue into the interaction 
between programs and the net benefits to household well being.  
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Table A.1 Characteristics of TANF Leaver Samples by UI Applicant Status and by State 
 Florida Georgia Michigan Ohio Pooled Total 
UI applicant status Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Both 
Characteristics 18,309 27,936 27,257 96,444 4,776 16,267 11,116 51,084 61,458 191,731 253,189 
Age at TANF exita  31.9 − 30.0 29.1 29.7 27.6 30.0 27.5 30.5 28.5 29.0 
 Aged 18–24 0.219 − 0.308 0.369 0.326 0.459 0.289 0.436 0.279 0.399 0.366 
 Aged 25–44 0.720 − 0.633 0.572 0.623 0.498 0.661 0.530 0.663 0.552 0.582 
 Aged 45+ 0.062 − 0.059 0.059 0.050 0.042 0.050 0.034 0.058 0.050 0.052 
Gender, male 0.187 − − − 0.231 0.187 0.165 0.173 0.186 0.176 0.180 
Gender, female 0.813 − − − 0.769 0.813 0.835 0.827 0.814 0.824 0.820 
Race, whiteb 0.255 − 0.206 0.300 0.475 0.529 0.413 0.515 0.279 0.390 0.360 
Race, black 0.432 − 0.781 0.683 0.466 0.417 0.545 0.445 0.610 0.582 0.590 
Race, Hispanic 0.287 − 0.009 0.011 0.044 0.039 0.032 0.030 0.099 0.020 0.041 
Adults on case at exit − − 1.20 1.25 1.08 1.10 1.29 1.33 1.21 1.26 1.250 
 Children < age 18 − − 1.95 1.90 1.64 1.57 2.07 1.94 1.95 1.88 1.894 
 Children < age 6 − − 0.88 0.90 0.74 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.867 
Base period earningsc  $11,880  $8,239  $9,946  $7,640  $12,531  $7,260  $10,267  $6,766  $10,781 $7,462 $8,268 
High qtr. earningsc  $4,233  $3,266  $3,851  $3,096  $4,620  $2,988  $3,803  $2,753  $4,016 $3,020 $3,262 
 BPE < $10,000c  0.485 0.688 0.615 0.753 0.438 0.754 0.578 0.783 0.556 0.752 0.704 
Qtrs. TANF to unemp. 5.4 4.1 4.6 3.8 5.0 3.7 5.1 3.9 5.0 3.9 4.1 
Qtrs. empl. pre-TANF exit 5.7 5.6 6.0 5.4 7.2 6.1 7.4 6.5 6.3 5.8 5.9 
Qtrly. earn pre-TANF exit $2,197  $1,994  $1,916  $1,721  $2,501  $1,818  $1,913  $1,509  $2,045 $1,713 $1,793 
Qtrly. earn post=TANF exit $3,037  $2,244  $2,683  $2,154  $3,272  $1,960  $2,654  $1,775  $2,829 $2,050 $2,239 
Multiple employers from TANF exit to unemployed 0.520 0.480 0.465 0.422 0.445 0.384 0.529 0.480 0.491 0.443 0.455 
Qtrs. employed before unemployment (of 12) 8.7 7.7 8.4 7.4 9.3 7.8 9.3 7.9 8.7 7.6 7.9 
 a In Florida, age data are available at TANF exit. We construct age start with age as of UI BYB which is 33.3 years. Since the average length of time from TANF exit to new 
unemployment is 5.4 quarters for UI applicants (or 1.4 years), the average age at TANF exit is set at 31.9 years.  
b Because Florida uses Hispanic and non-Hispanic distinctions in its race categories (white non-Hispanic, white and Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, black and Hispanic, etc.) means 
are not strictly comparable to the other states.  
c Defined for both applicants and nonapplicants as the first four of the five quarters preceding the quarter of new unemployment. 
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